COMMENTARY
Oscar S. Gray*

The Reporters’ recommendations for updating the provisions of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts that refer to “emotional distress”
or “emotional disturbance” are generally progressive within the
mainstream of American jurisprudence. No doubt most of us would
ordinarily consider that to be an admirable outcome for a
Restatement revision. Yet I cannot help thinking that, when the
time comes to prepare a Restatement (Fourth) of Torts, our
successors will look back on our efforts on the Restatement (Third) of
Torts as a lost opportunity to have done better.
Specifically, the relentless emphasis in this draft Restatement
(Third) on a supposed distinction between “physical” and
“emotional” (to the point that the very name of this Restatement
project was changed in midstream to “Liability for Physical and
1
Emotional Harm” ) points the discussion in the wrong direction, in
light of what we seem to be learning from the modern neurosciences.
I do not suggest that the neurosciences have come to the point of
enabling diagnoses, much less forensic demonstrations, to be made
from brain scans. But it does seem that the more we learn from
them, the more confirmation there appears to be of a physiological
basis for the phenomena the Reporters would lump as “emotional,”
and the more artificial the distinction that the Reporters adopt as
fundamental appears to be.
At a minimum, this
“emotional”/“physical” distinction casts a pall of apparent
antiscience over our work and makes us appear obsolete from the
outset.
Rather than a distinction between “physical” and “emotional,” I
would suggest that we should be exploring a distinction between
what might be called “mere feelings” on the one hand and “injury”
on the other. Only the former, which probably correspond with what
is sometimes called “affects,” are plausibly described by the term
“emotional distress.” These are the unpleasant states of mind that
we have been accustomed to considering noncompensable in
negligence except parasitically, e.g., sorrow or indignation.
While they may be intense, these feelings usually fade with
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time, without special treatment. They conspicuously inhabit the
conscious mind. Indeed, it is the conscious awareness of them that
itself constitutes the “feelings” in question. And, most important,
they are not considered pathological. They are instead the normal
reactions of healthy people to various underlying injuries, bodily or
dignitary.
Quite different are the medically recognized disorders, which
relate to disabilities, e.g., in occupational or social functioning. They
are the result of unconscious processes of the mind. They are not
recognized as disorders unless they are disabling—that is, unless
they impair functioning to a degree deemed clinically significant.
While they may be accompanied by emotional feelings, it is the
disability that constitutes the disorder. The connections between
the disabilities and their precipitating factors and any
accompanying feelings may be far from accessible to the victim’s
consciousness.
And these conditions typically do not heal
themselves without expert attention. They are injuries to a bodily
organ—the brain—in the same way as are conventional somatic
diseases, and they should be capable of sustaining a tort action in
the same way as other injuries to bodily organs.
Accordingly, to use the term “emotional disturbance” or
“emotional distress” to cover both types of mental phenomena is
both misleading and trivializing. Particularly unfortunate is the
suggestion that “‘[e]motional disturbance’ is distinct from bodily
2
harm and means harm to a person’s emotional tranquility.” The
harm in the case of disabling mental disorders is, I think, not so
much to an interest in “tranquility,” as to an interest in health.
The formulation that I suggest may seem unacceptable on
grounds of novelty. I know that my terminology will be relatively
unfamiliar to most American lawyers. It is not, however, novel to
the common-law world. In the mother jurisdiction of the common
law, England, the tone of discussion of the issues in question is
much closer, as I read the opinions, to my proposals than is that of
the proposed Restatement (Third). I do not put myself forward as
competent to state what English law is, a task apparently well
3
accomplished in Mr. Matthews’ article. But I can report on what
strikes an American lawyer on reading House of Lords speeches,
and I strongly recommend to any American lawyers and judges who
may be interested in further consideration of the subject of my
4
proposals that they read these House of Lords opinions. If they do,
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they will find a body of outcomes not markedly dissimilar on the
whole from those that would be expected in American courts. But
they will find them expressed in a tone, in a context of discourse,
that seems to me refreshing and sophisticated in a way that I think
the proposed Restatement (Third) often fails to match, precisely
because of its obsession with outmoded distinctions between
5
“physical” and “emotional,” and with concepts of “disturbance” and
6
loss of “tranquility.” Instead, a recognition that disabling mental
disorders, recognized as psychiatric illnesses, are an aspect of
personal injury as much “bodily” as is bloody somatic trauma, seems
to fit comfortably in British jurisprudence (the House of Lords has
treated Scots law as similar to English law on these points).
As Mr. Matthews concludes, “In various (though not all)
respects English law is more favorable to claimants than the
Restatement (Third)’s proposals, and it is suggested that some of
these situations might be accommodated without too adverse an
7
effect on the floodgates or bright-line issues.” More significant than
differences in specific outcomes, however, is the difference in tone
that becomes possible with a de-emphasis on distinctions between
“physical” and “emotional,” with a recognition of all illnesses as
aspects of bodily harm, and with the substitution of medical
diagnoses of psychiatric disorders to define freestanding
compensable conditions, in place of the vagaries of judicial or jury
understandings about the meaning of the word “severe” in the term
8
“severe emotional disturbance.”
These are matters about which we have something to learn from
our senior brethren. I believe Mr. Matthews is excessively tactful in
suggesting that the differences may be attributable to systemic
differences that have arisen in the two countries, such as differences
in the use of juries or in provisions for handling litigation expenses.
I do not think these systemic differences account for the differences
in terminology and tone to which I refer. I believe, rather, that the
English judges have simply done a better job than we have in
thinking through some of the issues. Perhaps by the time of the
Restatement (Fourth) we will have caught up.
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